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Agriculture is the main water-using sector in Southern European Countries, such as Spain
and Italy. Innovative institutional solutions for reducing water use or increasing its efficiency
are pursued by recent legislation concerning water, in particular by the Water Framework
Directive (WFD). Even if not explicitly considered by the directive, water markets may be seen
as a kind of instrument responding to the guiding principles of the upcoming water regulation.
The issue of water markets is very much debated in the water economics literature and
particularly in the agricultural water literature.
Water markets refer to a mechanism of water allocation based on the exchange of rights
on water use. Water markets are proposed and supported by economic theory on the ground
that they produce an efficient allocation of water resources. Criticisms to water markets may
derive both on the ground of economic efficiency itself (for example due to higher transaction
costs and expenditure for wider water transport systems) and on equity considerations (for
example the concentration of water on the more efficient farms that would specialise in
intensive production, while the others would retain less intensive crops).
The objective of this paper is to test to what extent water markets may contribute to the
improvement of the efficiency of water use.
The analysis is based on a linear programming model applied at basin level, comparing
the situation with and without market and including transaction costs proportional to the
amount of water exchanged. The model simulates the behaviour of different farm types,
derived from cluster analysis on a sample of farms in each area.
The model is tested in two areas in Southern Italy and Spain. The paper confirms that
water markets have the possibility to improve water use efficiency. However, the exchanges are
very much affected by the amount of transaction costs, even for transaction costs relatively
low. In the case of Lower Ter, gross margin increase due to markets may be as high as 30%
which is rather a considerable amount. Instead, the highest increase in Foggia is only about
10%, a result that may be regarded as hardly relevant.
In Foggia the benefits of the water market collapse only when transaction costs are
between 0,1 and 0,2 EUR/m
3 (that may be regarded as a fairly high amount). On the contrary,
Lower Ter is more sensitive to transaction costs and 0,075 EUR/m
3 are enough to cause the
market to shut down whatever the water quota.
When potential improvements occur, an additional issue arises, i.e. the institutional
acceptance of market criteria for water allocation purposes. The general attitude in Europe still
appears against such a solution. However, the changing economic context (agricultural
markets, demographic trends) tend to decrease rigidities about water exchange, particularly
among farmers.Agricultural water markets: exploring limits and opportunities in Italy and Spain
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1.  Introduction
Agriculture is the main water-using sector in Southern European Countries, such as Spain
and Italy. The sector of water regulation is undergoing strong changes due to the increasing
perception of the issue of water scarcity. Innovative institutional solutions for reducing water
use or increasing its efficiency are pursued by recent legislation concerning water.
The legal framework in the EU is today faced with the application of the Water
Framework Directive (WFD) (OJ, 2000). The WFD introduces the principle of Full Cost Recovery
(FCR) and the Polluter Pays Principles (PPP). It also proposes economic instruments as
recommended tools for the regulation of water use and pollution (WATECO, 2003). Even if not
explicitly considered by the directive, water markets may be seen as a kind of instrument
responding to the view that water may be considered as an economic good, or, at least having
an economic component that requires as much as possible an efficient use.
The issue of pricing policy and water markets is very much debated in the water
economics literature and particularly in the agricultural water literature (Lee, 1997; Schiffler,
1997; Easter et al., 2004).
The objective of this paper is to test to what extent water markets may contribute to the
improvement of the efficiency of water use. The analysis is based on a linear programming
model applied at basin level. The model is tested in two areas in Southern Italy and Spain.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 shortly describes the theoretical
background for water markets. Section 3 describes the methodology adopted. Section 4
illustrates the characteristics of the study areas. Section 5 summarises the main results for the
two study areas, followed by a brief discussion in section 6.
2.  Theoretical and policy background forwater markets
Water markets refer to a mechanism of water allocation based on the exchange of rights
on water use. Water markets are proposed and supported by economic theory on the ground
that they produce an efficient allocation of water resources (Milliman, 1956; Lee, 1997;
Schiffler, 1997; OECD, 2003; Easter et al., 2004).
Criticisms to water markets may derive both on the ground of economic efficiency itself
and on equity considerations.
Economic criticisms to market efficiency can be based on the argument that market
transaction costs may be higher than those produced by other mechanism of water allocation.
Transaction costs include all costs made necessary by the carrying out of a transaction; they
may emerge ex ante (for the collection of information, negotiation, contracts writing, etc.) or ex
post (for contract enforcement, etc.) (Williamson, 1985).
The functioning of water markets requires farmers to find out partners in the transaction
and some process for contract negotiation, that may be implemented in various ways. In many
cases, the present system of water distribution already causes high transaction costs (e.g.
irrigation boards costs for water management, definition and enforcement of property rights). It
is not clear to what extent water markets would actually increase such costs. At the moment,
data available are very limited and transaction costs would, in any case, change very much
from case to case and over time.
One major issue may be the cost of water transport, necessary for a market to exist,
where possible traders are not already connected by water infrastructures (canals, pipes).
From the analytical point of view, both the amount and the structure of market costs
(transaction plus transport costs) may be relevant. In principle they may be fixed or
proportional to water exchange. They can also be differentiated between vendors and sellers,
and depend on the size of the farm and its location.
Markets may be criticised also on the ground of equity considerations. Chan (1989)
emphasizes this problem, which increases the more unequal are the participant agents in the
market.
Another problem is the possible existence of negative externalities or third-party effects.
Howe et al. (1986) emphasize as market deficiencies the changes in the amount and quality of
the return water volumes, although they raise solutions to mitigate these effects.Pujol J., Raggi M., Viaggi D.
4 DEIAgraWP-05-001
In addition, it is likely that water markets would produce a concentration of water on the
more efficient farms that would specialise in intensive production, while the others would retain
less intensive crops. This phenomenon has been observed in Australia, Chile and the United
States. While this implies an increase of heterogeneity across farms, it also contributes to the
increase of the total agricultural production and the number of agricultural jobs (Sumpsi et al,
1998).
The contribution to efficiency is a relevant point for agriculture. Most of European
agriculture is undergoing major changes with abandonment by some farmers and an attempt
by others to recover competitiveness in the global market. Hence there are a number of farms
that do not fully use they rights on water, while others are incurring high costs to gain (more or
less legally) access to additional water resources.
Water markets may be implemented only when a legal basis exists. In this sense, Spain
adopted a normative that allows for the exchange of water rights. In Italy the legal basis for
proper water markets is usually considered not to exist. However, there is evidence of formal or
informal markets for water in the south and, to a lesser extent, in the north, even if their size is
almost impossible to assess.
A key issue for the setting of water markets is the existence of well defined property
rights on water and the availability of low cost water transport infrastructures. On the other
hand, water markets may be simply represented by transfers of rights, without real movement
of water in excess with respect to the situation without market.
Existing experiences around the world (USA, South Africa, Australia) also show that water
markets are acceptable in a mature legal system and in communities with high degree of trust.
This is made necessary by the fact that the selling of the right may be associated to
expectations of losing the right. In addition, water exchanges need to be supported by trustable
systems for contract enforcement.
3.  Methodology
The methodology is based on the use of a linear programming model at basin level. The
reference model is given by well established basin level modelling such as those illustrated by
Tisdell (2001) and may be seen as the transposition at basin level of widely used farm level
linear programming models (see for example Gomez-Limon et al., 2000; Berbel and Gutierrez,
2005; Bazzani et al. 2005). Similar models have already been used in seminal analysis of water
markets in Italy and Spain (Arriaza et al., 2002; Bazzani, 2004). The main contribution of this
paper is to enrich such models by explicitly taking into account transaction costs.
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where:
j λ = surface proportion of the j farm typology (weight);
GMij = gross margin for crop i on farm j;
xij = crop surface for crop i on farm j;
cjz =technical coefficient for crop i, on farm j, for constraint z;
vjz = other resources availability on farm j, for constraint z;Agricultural water markets: exploring limits and opportunities in Italy and Spain
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i w = water use for crop i (m
3/ha);
aj = water quota available on farm j.
The model runs per hectare of land, so that the land used for each crop is expressed as a
fraction of 1.
This kind of model is relatively simple and often used for the economic analysis of
irrigation at basin level. It allows to identify optimal solutions and reactions of farmers to water
policy changes. The basic structure illustrated in the model refers to the hypothesis of different
water endowments in different farms; with no water exchanges allowed.
When water trading is allowed, the models changes in two ways. On one side, water
availability in each farm is given by the initial quota, plus the water purchased, minus the water
sold. This have to be connected to an additional complementary constraint saying that water
purchased must be equal to water sold by farms. Secondly, market likely would imply
(additional) transaction costs. In the present model only transaction costs proportional to water
exchanges are assumed to exist.
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j w = water purchased by farm j;
s
j w = water sold by farm j;
t
p = transaction cost of purchasing water;
t
s = transaction costs of selling water.
The gross margin accounts for gross revenues minus all variable costs, including eventual
costs related to the acquisition of water. In the case with water market, the gross margin of
each farm typology changes further as a function of revenues or payments due, respectively, to
water selling or purchasing.
A key factor in determining the profitability of water markets is the actual level of
transaction costs. In absence of reliable estimates of such costs, a sensitivity analysis has been
carried out in order to quantify the thresholds above which the market is not economically
feasible.
There are some main assumptions of the model that need to be clarified. First the
sequence of actions: the farmer knows his water quota, then decides about water rights
exchange, then takes all his farming decisions after knowing water availability. All farmers act in
a context of perfect information about the technical possibilities (cost, production) given by the
total water available after exchange, but is not fully informed free of costs about other farmersPujol J., Raggi M., Viaggi D.
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actions and purposes. This give rise to the possibility of transaction costs, both ex ante and ex
post.
The contract consists in the engagement by a farmer not to use its right on water (seller)
and in gaining the possibility to use the same amount of water by the counterpart (buyer). A
system of water distribution reaching all farmers is supposed already to exist, so water
distribution does not have any implication in terms of transport costs.
4.  The study areas and model validation
The models (1) and (2) have been constructed for two case studies. The main features of
the two study areas are illustrated in table 1.
Table 1 Main features of the two areas
Lower Ter Foggia
Water supply Dams, Ter river , private wells Dams, Ofanto river, private wells
Water distribution system Canals, pipes and drains (not pressure) Pressure pipes
Irrigation system Superficial irrigation Drip irrigation
Water price Variable from 6.18 to 59.77 EUR/hectare 0.09 EUR/m3
Prevailing tariff system Area payment based on  irrigated surface Volumetric
Agricultural surface in the RIB (ha) 7100 143000
Area in the sample (ha) 1373.4 1258.6
Number of farms in the sample 60 131
Average farm size in the sample (ha) 22.89 9.6
Methodology for the identification of
farm types
Cluster analysis Cluster analysis
Number of typologies modelled 4 3
The first one is the Community of Irrigants of Lower Ter in Catalonia (in the Northeast of
Spain). A Community of Irrigants is a grouping of all the owners of a same irrigable zone, who
are united by law for the independent and common administration of public waters. The area is
characterised by the cultivation of corn, fruit trees, alfalfa and other minor crops. In addition in
the zone there are bovine farms with cultures for animal feeding.
The sampling was within the irrigation community by quotas. The parameter used in the
definition of the quotas was the farm’s surface. The sample consists in 60 farms, divided in 4
farm types. It was chosen in such a way as to reflect the same distribution of farm surface as in
the whole area.
The second case study is located in the South of Italy (Puglia), in the Reclamation and
Irrigation Board (RIB) of Capitanata (Province of Foggia)
1. The RIBs (Consorzi di Bonifica e
Irrigazione) are public bodies managed as associations of landowners, that control land
reclamation and the distribution of water over a certain area. Agriculture in the study area is
based on the combination of high income industrial tomato and highly subsidised locally
traditional crops, such as rainfed durum wheat. The development of high value added crops,
such as tomato and other vegetables is counterbalanced by a high impact on the environment
and is dependent upon a sufficient water availability. The sample consists in 131 farms, divided
in 3 farm types, one based on tomato-durum wheat and the other two cultivating a more wide
range of vegetables.
Farm typologies in each study area were selected on the basis of Cluster Analysis on a
data set derived from a representative sample of farms, validated through interviews with local
experts. For each cluster we considered different constraints such as crop rotation, labour
                                                          
1 The models used in the case of Foggia where based on data collection and validation carried out
during the project WADI “Sustainability of European Irrigated Agriculture under Water Framework
Directive and Agenda 2000” (EVK1-2000-00057) (Berbel and Gutierrez, 2005).Agricultural water markets: exploring limits and opportunities in Italy and Spain
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availability, land, etc. that refer to specific characteristics of each farm typology. Four clusters
where identified for Lower Ter and three for Foggia (table 2).
Table 2 Types of farms identified by means the cluster analysis
Zone Short name Farm typology
LT.1 Productive orientation extensive- mixed crops (‘Mixed’)
LT.2 Productive orientation fruit (‘Fruit’)
LT.3 Productive orientation livestock (‘Livestock’)
Lower Ter
LT.4 Productive orientation extensive-corn (‘Corn’)
Fg.1 Small farm - Productive orientation extensive-tomato (‘Small extensive’)
Fg.2 Small farm - Productive orientation vegetables (‘Small vegetables’) Foggia
Fg.3 Large farm - Productive orientation extensive-tomato (‘Large extensive’)
Models were calibrated using primary data collected from the surveyed farms. Constraints
include standard constraints such as land, labour, commercial constraints and rotations. Labour
constraints have been constructed by period (table 3).
Table 3 Main features of the models
Lower Ter Foggia
Model LT.1 LT.2 LT.3 LT.4 Fg.1 Fg.2 Fg.3
Average farm size (ha) 7,52 7,71 31,36
Objectives
  * Gross Margin X X X X X X X
Constraints:
   - Land X X X X X X X
   - Water X X X X X X X
   - Labour XXX
   - CAP (set-aside) X X X X
   - Market X
   - Rotations X X X X X X X
   - Specific type of soil X X
   - Cattle feeding X
Cluster weight 0,34 0,19 0,12 0,35 0,365 0,361 0,274
Models were validated against the actual crop mix seen as a combination of farming
activities (tables 4 and 5).
Table 4 Deviations between real and simulated values of the percentage crop surface
(Lower Ter)
  LT.1 LT.2 LT.3 LT.4
Corn -6,00 -0,97 0,98 -1,00
Sunflower 4,00 0,93 0,00 0,14
Other grain cereals 3,00 -1,90 1,00 -0,07
Winter forage 0,00 1,85 -0,45 0,07
Alfalfa 0,00 2,94 0,30 2,00
Fruit trees 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00
Poplars 2,91 0,00 0,00 0,30
Set-aside -1,00 -1,88 -0,82 -1,52
Other grain cereals (non irrigated) -3,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Total deviation 19,91 10,49 3,54 5,11Pujol J., Raggi M., Viaggi D.
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Table 5 Deviations between real and simulated values of the percentage crop surface
(Foggia)
  Fg.1 Fg.2 Fg.3
Tomato 6,70 6,93 2,22
Durum wheat -2,58 -9,36 -2,22
Durum wheat and broccoli -0,39 2,72 0,00
Asparagus -3,72 -0,28 0,00
Total deviation 13,39 19,29 4,45
5.  Results
Gain from markets for different levels of transaction costs and quota in the two areas are
reported in figures 1 and 2, expressed as a percent increase of total gross margin of the area.
In the case of Lower Ter benefits may be as high as 30% which is rather a considerable
amount. Instead, the highest increase in Foggia is only about 10%, a result that may be
regarded as hardly relevant. In both cases, the advantages in terms of increase of gross margin
appear limited to low levels of transaction costs and intermediate levels of water availability.
In Foggia the benefits of the water market collapse only when transaction costs are
between 0,1 and 0,2 EUR/m
3 (that may be regarded as a fairly high amount). On the contrary,
Lower Ter is more sensitive to transaction costs and 0,075 EUR/m
3 are enough to cause the
market to shut down whatever the water quota.
The quotas corresponding to the higher increase in gross margin are respectively 2000
m
3/ha for Lower Ter and 1000 for Foggia. Both amounts are actually very close to real amounts
distributed in the drought years. Particularly in the Lower Ter, however, the volumes provided
in the last years has been enough higher. Also, in the case of Lower Ter restrictions to water
availability or, possibly, intersectoral water exchanges, may derive from a strong intersectorial
competition on the use of the resource, for example by the neighbouring golf courses or the
close tourist zones (Costa Brava).Agricultural water markets: exploring limits and opportunities in Italy and Spain
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Figure 1 Gain from markets for different levels of transaction costs – Lower TerPujol J., Raggi M., Viaggi D.
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Figure 2 Gain from markets for different levels of transaction costs – Foggia
Figure 3 and 4 show the total water exchange among clusters as a function of the water
quota. Again the exchanges are very much affected by the amount of transaction costs (TC),
even for transaction costs relatively low.Agricultural water markets: exploring limits and opportunities in Italy and Spain
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The figures highlight the strongly different position of different kinds of farms with
respect to water markets. In Lower Ter, cluster 1 and 4 are the main sellers, while cluster 3
and, to a lesser extent cluster 2 are the buyers. This denotes a clear polarisation for water
towards livestock and fruit farms. In the same way, in the case of Foggia, cluster 2 is the main
buyer, denoting a strong concentration of water resources towards intensive vegetable growers.Pujol J., Raggi M., Viaggi D.
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Positions, even the role as buyers and sellers, may reverse depending on the water quota
available.
High transaction costs may cause some farms to exit the market (e.g. cluster 3 in Lower
Ter). Water exchange tends to increase and then to decrease as a function of the quota.
However, where the exit point from water use at price zero (lower point of the demand curve)
is very different among clusters, a certain amount of exchange may be profitable even for
plenty of water available.
The results illustrated here were complemented by a short survey carried out among
farmers in Lower Ter and by interviewing the responsible of the irrigation boards in Foggia. The
general attitude is clearly against market, partly for equity considerations, partly because a
discussion about water market is perceived as being politically difficult and potentially able to
produce conflicts. Where farmers where interviewed, they showed a general interest towards
buying water, while they are less willing to sell water. One possible explanation is in the fear of
loosing the right to water use over time, so that the expected gains from market would be only
temporary, and markets would actually lead to a depreciation of their assets.
6.  Discussion
The paper confirms that water markets have the possibility to improve water use
efficiency. However it also highlights that this potential strongly depends on the institutional
ability to allow exchange with reasonably low transaction costs. Part of the issue is to be
connected to the actual nature of the transaction costs considered: are they actual costs (time
spent by the farmers, true legal costs) or costs linked to risk perception and uncertainty about
the future allocation of water rights? Are these costs due to the form of exchange and can be
lowered by a revision of water institutions? Are limits and guarantees to the participants on the
market the right ones, in order to avoid excessive risk perception and non-participation?
Answers to these questions may derive from further research on this field. They would
particularly benefit from a more detailed modelling of the information asymmetries and from a
combined approach linking more directly modelling with an institutional, and possibly a
participatory, approach.
Also, farmers’ attitudes and objective could be analysed more in detail trough
multicriteria analysis, in order to improve the actual degree of participation and utility derived
from water markets. Other likely issues of interest would be the degree of specialisation
brought about by the market and the side effects on equity issues.
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